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RATIONAL BASIS OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
To say that a legal institution,-private property, the federal govern-
ment of the United States, Columbia University,---exists is to say that a
group of persons is doing something, is acting in some way. It is to point to a
particular aspect of human behavior. If the federal constitution had not been
written and ratified by somebody, the legal institution called the federal
government would never have existed. A legal institution is human behavior.
But a legal institution is something more than the way men act on a single
occasion. If after the constitution was adopted attempts to induce persons to
act under it by accepting office had failed, it would remain the program of an
unsuccessful reform movement. Or if the Supreme Court had been organized
but the judges had resigned after hearing a single cause, the organization of
the court and the submission of the case would be events, and the court itself
a clause in the constitution. A legal institution is the happening over and over
again of the same kind of behavior.
Even repetition, however, is not sufficient to make us recognize the series
as an institution. The behaving over and over again in the same way must
be the result of a habit to behave in that manner. The attendance of a student
upon his university lectures after six weeks of regular attendance is a psycho-
logical process,-a way of behaving,---different from his attendance during the
first week, or from his attendance at the same play for the sixth time during
the winter. In the first case his behavior is like that of a trained dog answering
his master's whistle; in the other two like that of a shy dog tempted by a
choice bit in a stranger's hand. The attendance each day at their classes of
the teachers and students of Columbia University is not because of a fresh
act of judgment by each that his attendance is an available means to an end.
So long as their mental processes remained at this high level, Columbia would
be the name of a series of events, the continuance of which would be highly
contingent, and not an institution. No testator would risk intestacy by nam-
ing Columbia in his residuary clause. No parent would think it worthwhile
to enroll in 1923 his ten year old child in the class of 1930. In moving from
bed to desk each morning, even high officers of the federal government are not
motivated by an altruistic impulse to make the world safe for democracy.
If they were, we should anxiously scan the newspapers each day to see if there
had been a federal government yesterday. It is the habitual character of the
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behavior which we call an institution upon which we rely in inferring that the
behavior will continue, i. e., that the legal institution is permanent or rela-
tively so. We may not be able to account for the fact that men's actions move
along the well-cut channels or straggling ruts of habits, but that they do is
the conclusion of the philosopher, the psychologist, and the common man.
In consequence of its predictability, an institution becomes along with the sun,
the tides, the rain, one of the constant factors among the welter of variables
which are taken account of in making a judgment. One may be far from
certain of what will be a neighbor's behavior when he is asked for his daughter
in marriage, but at the same time confidently judge how the neighbor would
feel and act if his horse were, without his consent, used for plowing another's
land. But in both cases, in view of the institutions of marriage and of private
property, one could count with sufficient certainty on the behavior of the
community when stimulated by the courses of conduct supposed.
Perhaps in what has been said there has been implicit the assumption that
the habits of the group of persons whose behavior is most conspicuous when
we observe an institution,-such as the owners of property in land and chattels,
the officers of the federal government, the teachers and students of Columbia,
-are the only habits which are of significance. But certainly this is not the
case. If every one in the United States, save those actively engaged in carry-
ing on the federal government, should awaken some morning with only a
memory of the federal government as an historical event, and freed from the
habits which at once are the impulse to cooperative response to the actions of
its officers and the motor mechanisms to express those impulses effectively,
for a time at least the federal government would be a potentiality only and
the form of the future organization of the forty-eight states would be in doubt.
Indeed the most important factor in determining the form of that organiza-
tion would by no means be the force at the disposal of the former government.
An inquiry, then, into the rational basis of legal institutions is nothing
less than an inquiry into the rational basis of certain habits. Is it proposed to
ascertain by the study of history and prehistory the actual content of the logi-
cal process which found a solution of its problem in the initiation of the modes
of behavior which later became habitual and an institution? In the case of
such an institution as private property does any one seriously expect such a
jewel from the hands of the students of prehistory? But the case of institu-
tions of more recent origin is different. Diaries, correspondence, pamphlets,
convention proceedings, preambles, resolutions, and even charters and con-
stitutions themselves are available. We might make an induction as to the
end which some of the conspicuous founders and perpetuators of Columbia
had in view in establishing the school and as to their logical process in deter-
mining that a college was a means to that end. But no diligence can be expected
to unearth the logical processes of all the persons,-legislators, trustees, teach-
ers, students, employees, parents, and surrounding community,-whose co-
operation was necessary to initiate the behavior which we choose to dis-
tinguish as an institutional pattern in the fabric of human action. However,
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even if at the end of our research we found a single Mark Hopkins and a single
log, it is not clear what would be the value of an accurate description of his
logical process. It should be some evidence of the ends and of the state of
knowledge of the mechanisms of society entertained by Mark Hopkins and
probably some of his contemporaries. Such evidence is material for history
viewed as a catch-all for collected or recovered facts which may at some time
be useful in the solution of a problem not yet formulated. It is conceivably a
fact for the psychologist as a student of behavior, though obviously less valu-
able than human behavior under the eye of the observer. But it throws no
light on any pertinent question as to what the institution has been, is or will
be. Newcomen may have invented his steam engine with the end in view of
keeping mine-shafts free of water. But his logical process in judging that his
invention was a means to that end is quite irrelevant if we seek to determine
towards what ends the invention has actually carried us, and whether it will
serve our present purposes. In short, in no inquiry with respect to an institu-
tion, save only in an inquiry into its history, is the logical process of its found-
ers a relevant fact; and the historical inquiry serves an end as well served by
the history of any other institution, and better served by the study under our
own eyes of the human animal.
It cannot be supposed therefore that Professors Wigmore and Kocourek
in their Rational Basis of Legal Institutions 1 are addressing themselves to
the hopeless and purposeless task of ascertaining the logical processes which
were parts of the various acts of the various persons whose conduct was the
beginning of legal institutions. Indeed, an examination of the excerpts which
comprise the volume discloses that this was not their objective. Were they
seeking a rational basis in divine revelation of the perfect society and inviting
us to a critique of group habits by comparing them with logical deductions
from the revelation? No; their rational basis is more naive, if less mystical.
It is human "nature." We are invited to weigh legal institutions by putting
them in the balance with deductions from a supposed but unstated generaliza-
tion as to man's nature. An obvious objection to this approach, which is
classical in the social sciences, is that the paucity of observed facts about
man's native equipment makes any wide generalization impossible. Modem
anthropology and psychology do not give us any basis of fact for an induction
as to what organization of society is ideal for the human animal. Instead
they indicate an unexpected native adaptability to very diverse forms. Not-
withstanding the varieties of culture which ethnology and prehistory disclose
from neolithic man in Europe to the city dwellers of today, there is no evi-
dence of evolution in man during the period. But this is not the most serious
objection. Nor is the objection the rearing of an edifice of speculation upon
opinion and opinion upon speculation. At least this flimsy structure contains
I Rational Basis of Legal Institutions. By various authors. Editorial preface by John H.
Wigmore and Albert Kocourek and an Introduction by Oliver Wendell Holmes. New York:
The Macmillan Co. 1923. pp. xxxii, 603.
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a thousand and one nights' entertainment for the intellectual, aspirations for
the liberal, comfort for the conservative, and propaganda for the radical.
The serious vice in approaching a study of legal institutions from the
standpoint of a question of their rational basis is that by posing a problem
that does not exist, the real problem for which the editors were groping and
the most promising approach to it are so effectively obscured. Is this problem
the rational ends of legal institutions? The end of a legal institution is the
end towards which we judge the institution leads, towards the attainment of
which the institution is a means. We may judge that the Supreme Court of
the United States, a court vested with the power to declare statutes invalid,
is a means to the end of preserving the institution of private property. We
may think a legislature with unlimited power to tax is a means to the end of
destroying the institution of private property. Is either the preservation or
destruction of private property an end which is rational? One may choose
either. Is one choice more rational than the other? Surely this depends upon
the consequences, the ends to which the choice leads. An end, then, is rational
in so far only as it is a means to another end. If one's end is increasing the
stock of industrial equipment, the preservation of private property is rational
if it is a means to that end. As an end to which the Supreme Court is a means,
it is neither rational nor irrational. But are there no ultimate ends which are
rational? Human experience discloses no ultimates. Events are related to
events so that each is at once an end and a means. Ultimates are phantoms
drifting upon the stream of day dreams. Nor are penultimate ends rational.
A rational or logical process is directed towards an end chosen before the
process is begun. The process is judging that certain means will tend to that
end. It is the projection of an hypothesis as to what manipulation of facts
will bring about the end. The end of the hypothesis is experiment. The
test of the validity of the hypothesis is the success of the manipula-
tion. If the facts for manipulation do not exist, the hypothesis is not
rational and the end is a day dream, not a term in a logical process. It is the
necessity of experiment which restricts us to proximate ends and a study of
means thereto. Penultimates are not rational because the means towards
their accomplishment are not at hand. In weighing an end, the relevant ques-
tions are, What are the immediate means to it? To what proximate end is it
a means? The problem, then, that loomed so obscurely before the editors,
was not one of rational ends, but rather, What are means to legal institutions
and to what proximate ends are legal institutions means? Concretely, of
what facts are group habits consequences and what are the consequences of
group habits?
Group habits are now recognized as means, something to be manipulated,
something to be controlled by the process of manipulation. Inquiry at once
turns in the direction of detailed observation and systematic experiment.
Visions of individualistic and collectivistic utopias vanish from the observer's
mind, and in their place his imagination is struggling to guide him to the
formulation of an available method for the accurate determination, for example,
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of the number of farm leaseholds in the United States last year, or the num-
ber of married women habitually engaged in another remunerative occupa-
tion, or the quantity and productive capacity of the industrial equipment in
the United States on January 1st, 1922.
Detailed observation of such group habits as legal institutions shows
each institution is a complex aggregate of many specific group habits. Private
property may be a useful concept for some purposes, but it is an intellectual
device which must not be allowed to obscure the duty not to commit a nuisance
on one's land, the liability to the police power and to the power to tax, the
disability to alienate in certain modes, the liability to be deprived of one's
land or chattels by a third person's sale to a bona fide purchaser, which, as
well as the privilege to use, the right to exclude others, and the power to
alienate by deed and will, are some of the items described by the word prop-
erty. Indeed, these rights, powers, privileges, immunities, duties, liabilities
and disabilities are themselves simply generic names for aggregates of minute
channels of conduct, all of which taken together are private property. Obser-
vation shows the material to consist of units of conceivably manageable pro-
portions and dispels the notion that the institution of private property exists
as an object for experimentation.2
Each of the specific group habits is an aggregate of the individual habits
of the members of the group. Individual habits, then, are the means to be
manipulated by systematic experimentation. The study of legal institutions
must begin with the motivation of habit formation, stabilization, modification,
and obliteration, with the "drives," whether instinctive or otherwise, which
motivate one to behave habitually, and the impulses which push in another
direction. Here the psychologists are ready to assist with formulations and
facts. 3
Next the limiting conditions of the individual's biological and social
inheritance must be considered. It is not to be expected that a Japanese baby
adopted and brought up in the United States by Southern foster-parents,
who are by profession tumblers and in religion Methodists, will either habitually
assume the posture of standing on his hands or will be other than a Christian.
In college he may be taught the Russian language, and to transfer his faith
to the coming of a communistic utopia, but he cannot be taught to speak the
Russian language habitually, to get his living except along the grooves of the
existing economic order, or really to think except about the problems of his
life, and then only in terms of the existing facts of social organization. Native
psycho-physical equipment and the culture into which the individual is born
combine to reduce the means to experimental manipulation of legal institu-
tions to a few uninspiring tools. These, moreover, seem to be useful only in
an attack on culture. Native equipment at present at least is beyond the
2 Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptios (1923).
3John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (1922); Robert S. Woodworth, Dynamic
Psychology (1918); William McDougall, Psychology (1923).
HeinOnline -- 23 Colum. L. Rev. 613 1923
613
t f l i i t
ber of arried o en a it all e a e i t r r r ti
ti , r t tit r ti it i
t e it t t s r t, .
t il r ti l
i tit ti i l i
r ert s f l t , i
device hich st t ll t r t t t t
on one's land, t e lia ilit t t li r t
disability to alienate in certai es, t li ilit t ri '
land or chattels by a t ir ers 's s l t fi ,
ell as the privilege to use, the right t e cl e t rs, t r t
alienate ee a ill, r s f t it i
erty. Indeed, t ese ri ts, rs, i il , ,
and disabilities are the selves si ply e eric a es f r r t s f i t
channels f c ct, ll f i t t t r i t .
vation sho s the aterial to consist of its f c cei a l l r -
portions a is els t ti t t t i tit ti i t
as a j t f r ri t ti .2
f t ifi
of the e bers of the group. Individual a its, t , r t
anipulated by syste atic e eri e tati . t l l i tit ti
ust begin ith the otivation f a it f r ti , t ili ti , i i ti ,
and obliteration, ith the"drives," hether instinctive r t er ise, i
otivate one to behave habitually, and t e i lses i s i t r
irecti . r t l i t
f ts.3
t t li iti iti '
inheritance st e si r . It i t t t se
adopted and brought up in the nited tates by outhern f ster- are ts,
ho are by profession tu blers a i r li i t ists, ill it r it ll
assu e t e st re f st i i r ill t i .
In college he ay be taught t e ssia l , t t f r i
to the co ing of a co unistic t ia, t t t t t
Russian language habitually, to et is li i t l t r t
existing econo ic order, r reall t t i t t t l
life, and then only in ter s f t e e isti f ts f i l r i ti . ti
psycho-physical equip ent a t e c lt re i t i t i i i l
co bine to reduce the ea s t e eri ental i l ti n l l i tit
tions to a fe uninspiring t ls. s , r r, t
an attack on culture. ative e i e t t r s t t l t i
I Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (1923).
3 John e ey, u an ature l :t ( ); t . rth, i
sychology (1918); illia lI, l ( 23).
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
reach of any of them.4 In any event, if biology and eugenics offered means
their use would involve a cultural change such as that we are now witnessing
in the gradual adoption of the practice of sterilizing feeble-minded persons.
The non-material culture of a group, its language, aesthetic standards,
religion, morality and legal institutions, changes both in consequence of in-
ventions of new behavior models, some of which become habitual in the group,
and in consequence of borrowings from other cultures. 5 But what invented
or borrowed behavior models axe adopted by the group seems to depend,
among other things, upon its existing material culture; that is, its stock of
buildings, machines, tools, technical processes, and so forth. For instance,
the legal privilege of the exclusive use of bronze objects manufactured by one's
slave would not be invented if the community did not already possess processes
and tools for manufacturing bronze objects. The legal device of distributing
ownership of units of industrial equipment among management, stockholders
and mortgagees would not be borrowed unless the state of the industrial arts
made for units so costly and complicated that such a distribution was thought
convenient.
Material culture, however, is itself being changed by the processes of
invention and borrowing. And the direction and rapidity of this change is,
it seems, determined by the existing material culture. The invention of the
wheel and of the gas engine must precede the invention of the automobile.
The invention of the moving-picture camera of today awaited the invention
of the photographic film. But control of invention and borrowing in the sphere
of material culture with a view to experimenting with institutions is not a
promising procedure. Experimentation implies use, and however limited in
space and time, its social consequences cannot be obliterated.
Changes in material culture, therefore, precede and control changes in
common habits and attitudes. But changes in the non-material culture, do
not follow immediately upon changes in that which is material. Indeed, they
appear often to lag far behind as in the case of the delay in the adoption of the
system of providing by an insurance fund for compensation to workmen
injured in industrial accidents. If such a lag is in fact a common phenomenon
in the process of the adjustment of legal institutions to material culture, then
an opportunity does exist for the experimental manipulation of legal institu-
tions, with a view to either lengthening or shortening the period of lag.6
If the editors had grasped the function of the rational process in human
enterprises and had succeeded in formulating the problem they were facing
as one of legal institutions as means to proximate ends; if they had seen the
point of departure to be a consideration of the hypothetical limits of the field
for the application of experimental methods; they would have arranged their
materials from the fields of philosophy, legal analysis, modem psychology,
Thomas H. Morgan, Physical Basis of Heredity (1919).
Robert H. Lowie, Primitive Society (1920); Alexander A. Goldenweiser, Early Civitlza-
tion (1922).
6 William F. Ogburn, Social Change (1922).
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biology, social psychology, anthropology, and sociology, according to the
pattern so hastily sketched in the last few paragraphs. The material would
have been chosen to display the evidence and conflicting interpretations
which are today the grist of these sciences.
The next step for the editors should have been an examination of the
tools,--the available means to experimentation. These are familiar enough
though we are more accustomed to use them after the fashion of rough and
ready frontier clearings rather than that of experiment stations. Foremost is
the legislative power of the government. Its exercise by statute, administra-
tive order and judicial decision is the existing method of patenting and offering
to the community behavior models which have been borrowed or invented.
Its study as a means to initiating experiment, and an examination of the
means to making the legislative power an effective means, should be an impor-
tant part of the book. The National Monetary Commission, the Federal
Trade Board, legislative reference bureaus, the Economic Research Bureau,
the Bureau of Chemistry, the removal of Constitutional limitations upon
legislative action, the power of the Supreme Court to block experiment, are a
few of the innumerable topics that suggest themselves for organization into a
comprehensive study of the existing and potential means of initiating rational
manipulation of legal institutions. There would be nothing so new as to
induce the pleasures of intoxication, nor anything so abstract and general as
to lull to the satisfactions of contemplation. After this the agencies for observ-
ing and recording the consequences of laws should be passed in review. The
elaboration of the census, a ministry of justice, the probation system, will serve
to suggest the topics for integration into a study of this aspect of experimenta-
tion.
Perhaps there should be added a third part containing some account of a
few of the current experiments we are blundering through without thought
of direction or control. Studies of collective bargaining and the injunction,
of the treatment of conscientious objectors and political prisoners during the
late war, and of criminal syndicalist laws, of prohibition, of the activities of
the Society for the Prevention of Vice, might be grouped under the heading of
Liberty. Under Competition, there might be placed something about the
Federal Trade Commission and judicial experimentation with "unfair" trade.
The New York rent laws, price control during the war, public utility rate
regulation, usury statutes, excess profits taxes, consumers codperation, might
be gathered into a chapter entitled Property. Inheritance Taxation could
be placed profitably under the heading of Succession; and certainly the opera-
tion and consequences of our laws as to abortion and birth-control, and of our
statutes and decisions relating to a minimum wage for women, could be decently
covered in a chapter on the Family.
In fact, where do the editors lead us when we have joined them in pursuit
of their will o' the wisp, the rational basis of liberty, property, succession,
-rlmily, and punishment? In the treatment of liberty, it is assumed that the
balance of reason decides against a community organization in which there is
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COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
no differentiated class which functions by encouraging or discouraging the
initiation and adoption of group habits, and in favor of a community organiza-
tion in which there is a governing group. "Scientific anarchism [is] dangerous
per se." 7 The first problem posed for thought is laissez faire versus socialism.
That both members of the antithesis are concepts describing nothing in ex-
perience, though making for an excellent debating title, effectively prevents
thought. Accordingly, the discussion addresses itself to the misleading ques-
tion, Should the governing class participate in attempts to prevent or to
initiate changes in legal institutions in case of changes in material culture, or
should it act as umpire impartially upholding the existing order? There is no
suggestion that the policy of laissez faire is the policy of maintaining existing
institutions for the moment regarded as fundamental, and that of necessity
it commits the government to opposition to changes in them.8 Consequently
there is not even a precise formulation of the real question debated, namely,
Should the governing class attempt to prolong or shorten the period of cultural
lag. Nevertheless, this is the question to which in all seriousness answers are
offered. Since the general form of the question bars any consideration of any
particular lag, of the means available in the actual situation, or of the immediate
ends or aims of the particular governing class, the efforts toward solution are
Gargantuan. The answers are deduced from the "doctrine of organic evolu-
tion," 9 "human welfare," and "natural law-law corresponding to the nature
of things," 10 " the general interest," 1 "Christian ethics," 2 and "traditional
morality." 13 There is general concurrence in the answer: the governing class
should as a general rule attempt to prolong the period of lag; but every particu-
lar instance should be dealt with as experience indicates. In short, the battle
never begins because the troops are exhausted by the elaborate preliminary
maneuvers. Dean Pound and Mrs. Bosanquet are the exceptions to this kind
of generalship. Both address themselves to giving an account and interpreta-
tion of facts which display particular cultural lags.
The selection and arrangement of the material under the heads of property
and succession are all that would be expected from a treatment of the institution
of property as a single problem to be settled a priori. We find on the one hand,
rationalization of the existing and, on the other, dreams of the future. The
collection proves Professor Small right in predicting in his interesting outline
that an "examination of typical opinions about property will at least furnish
warnings about outstanding fidilities of opinion . . ." 14 Occasionally the
worthwhile approach is suggested as when Dean Rashdall says, "the justifica-
tion of property must depend not upon any a priori principle but upon its
Rational Basis of Legal Institutions, op. cit., Carver, p. 159.
8 Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-coercive State (1922),
37 Pol. Sci. Quart., 470.
' Rational Basis of Legal Institutions, op. cit., Spencer, p. 4.
"I Ibid., Carver, pp. 154, 163.
" Ibid., Ely, p. 123.
'12 Ibi., Lovejoy, p. 52.
UIbid., Sharp, p. 74.
1"Ibid., Small, p. 194 [Italics mine].
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RATIONAL BASIS OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
social effects." 15 Indeed in Professor Charmont's contribution we have a
splendid example of the study of the social consequences in a particular locality
of a few specific rules relating to descent of land.
The next turn in the book brings us to the family. We are led by the hand
of "helpless babyhood" across "the chasm which divides animality from
humanity .. ." 16, only to find ourselves in the presence of "wretched mother-
hood and the feeble, base-born children of unbridled lust." 17 We are glad to
escape to hear Dr. Cabot's delightful little sermon "Spiritual Justification of
Monogamy," with which this part closes. The notable essay of this group is
that of Elsie Clews Parsons whose careful analysis of family relations is of the
sort that must precede any serious study of the family.
Upon opening the volume, we thought we sensed a spirit of weariness
in Mr. Justice Holmes' Introduction; upon closing the book, our confidence
is strengthened that this impression was correct.
COLUMBIA LAw SCHOOL
UNDERHILL M oORE
Ibid., RashdaU, p. 399.
"Ibid., pp. 470-i.
17 I bd., p. 544.
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